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PRE-ADJUDICATION REVIEW OF THE
SOCIAL RECORD IN JUVENILE COURT:
A LOW-VISIBILITY OBSTACLE TO A
FAIR PROCESS
Martin A. Frey* and Charles P. Bubany**
Substantial numbers of juveniles continue to be de-
prived of constitutional protections in the juvenile courts,
contrary to the letter and spirit of recent United States Su-
preme Court decisions. This is the result more often than not
of informal and low-visibility practices in the juvenile courts
which court decisions have left unchanged. Among these
practices is the review of the social record by the judge prior
to an adjudication of delinquency.
I. THE SOCIAL RECORD
The social record consists of a variety of information
concerning the juvenile, his background, and his offense.
The record may take the form of a formal clinical report
prepared by a juvenile court intake officer. It might be called
a social investigation report, social study, social background
report, case study, or probation report. Some records are less
formal. They include, or consist solely of, scattered pieces of
information in the form of memoranda of conversations with,
or documents obtained from, persons such as police officers,
school officials, probation officers, social workers, neighbors
and associates. Much of the information concerning the
youth may be like the juvenile process itself, largely "invisi-
ble" and not recorded within the two flaps of a folder. Never-
theless, the information is part of the youth's "social record"
even if it is not recorded but simply known by the officer of
the court.
The content of social records will vary with local proce-
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dure, the frequency with which the juvenile has appeared in
court, the stage in the proceeding when the social record is
viewed, and the type of case and issue before the court. In
general, a social record covers the personal history of the
child and his family; the child's social, emotional, mental
and physical development; and his environment including
his home, school, church and community influences. Em-
phasis is normally placed on the juvenile's relationship to
other members of his family and to others with whom he
comes in close contact. Some social records are masses of
facts and clinical reports regarding the child and his family.
Others contain evaluations and interpretations of these facts
in relation to the situation facing the child and his family
and recommendations for care or treatment.'
II. AN EVALUATION OF THE PROCEDURE
The need for a comprehensive social record is obvious.
It is an invaluable tool in understanding the child's physical,
social and emotional condition and the circumstances of his
alleged misconduct. Such an understanding is practically
indispensable in fashioning a disposition for the juvenile of-
fender appropriate to the goal of rehabilitation. Notwith-
standing its value, use of the social record by the judge prior
to adjudication is objectionable on two grounds. First, the
social record contains information which is irrelevant to the
adjudication decision and which cannot be effectively ex-
cluded from the adjudication decision once the trier of fact
has studied it. By definition, the information in the social
record goes beyond the scope of data relevant to adjudica-
tion. This information may be detrimental to the character
of the juvenile and his family since it gives the reader the
impression that this is a child in need of the services of the
juvenile court. In studying the social record the reader tends
to forget that the juvenile court must first find that the child
is within its jurisdiction by virtue of having committed, be-
' For a discussion of the contents of the social record see NCCD, GUIDES FOR
JUVENILE COURT JUDGES 49-56 (1957); U.S. DEP'T OF HEW, WELFARE ADMIN., STAN-




yond a reasonable doubt, the offense charged in the petition.
This finding must be made before the court may set to the
task of determining the program of rehabilitation that is best
for the child.
Second, information in the social record, even though
relevant, may be either false or unreliable. In re Gault' and
In re Winship3 emphasize that the adjudication phase of the
juvenile court hearing must be a search for truth. The inher-
ent danger of entering the case through the social record is
that this information is not tested for reliability by introduc-
tion in open court. This goes to the very heart of the rights
provided in Gault. Consideration of this information may
undermine the juvenile's right to notice of the charge, neu-
tralize the effectiveness of counsel, deny him confrontation
and cross-examination and abrogate his privilege against
self-incrimination. In addition it may erode the Winship re-
quirement that proof of commission of the offense be beyond
a reasonable doubt.
These objections have definite application to juvenile
court procedure. They impede the effectiveness and distort
the function of the screening stages in the pre-hearing pe-
riod. The impact of the misuse of the social record on the
preliminary inquiry illustrates this point. The purpose of the
preliminary inquiry is to determine whether the interests of
the public or of the juvenile require that a delinquency peti-
tion be filed. The nature of the investigation at the prelimi-
nary inquiry must relate to this purpose. Implicit is the so-
cial character of the juvenile and his relationship to society.
No reference is made to whether the juvenile committed the
act. Emphasis of the investigation is on the needs of the child
and society rather than on his commission of the offense. The
proper practice is to have the intake or probation officer, a
person separate and apart from the juvenile court judge,
review the social record and decide whether further action
should be taken. There is no determination of guilt at this
387 U.S. 1 (1967) (rights to notice of the charge, counsel, confrontation and
cross-examination and the privilege against self-incrimination).
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proof of commission of the offense must be beyond a
reasonable doubt).
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stage. If the decision is that a delinquency petition should
not be filed, the question of guilt will never be reached. If the
decision is to take further action, the probation officer will
not be involved in making the ultimate decision of guilt.
A judge who makes the decision at a preliminary inquiry
and does not use the social record cannot make an informed
determination whether the interests of the public or of the
juvenile require that further action be taken. Conversely, if
he does employ the social record, it is subject to misuse at
this point. To permit the judge to see the social record may
give him facts that are unreliable and irrelevant to the ques-
tion of guilt. These facts may affect his final judgment so
strongly that he will determine commission of the offense not
on involvement but on the needs of the juvenile. The exi-
gency of this type of decision is not the question since the
court's jurisdiction to provide for the needs of the juvenile is
limited until there has been proof that the juvenile has com-
mitted a proscribed act.
A similar distortion occurs when the "juvenile court" is
provided with the opportunity to dismiss the petition with-
out a hearing. At this stage those juveniles who do not need
a juvenile court hearing may be removed from the justice
process. The juvenile court judge who makes this decision
and does not use the social record in his determination
changes the function of the opportunity. It no longer serves
as a screening device for removing those who do not need a
juvenile court hearing at this time. Instead, it may serve only
to screen out those who were not involved in the conduct
charged in the petition or those who may have been involved
but the state does not have sufficient evidence to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that they were involved. The judge
who reviews the social record but decides not to dismiss,
subjects himself to the charge that he either has decided the
issue of delinquency without a hearing or at least now has
preconceived notions on the delinquency issues. The pre-
sumption of innocence is gone.
The next major screening stage is a juvenile court hear-
ing. At the hearing, when the issue of delinquency is con-
tested, the court should consider only the question of
[Vol. 12
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whether the juvenile comes within the court's jurisdiction.
For this purpose any matter or information relevant and
material to the circumstances or acts which are alleged to
bring him within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is
admissible and may be received in evidence.' The social re-
cord may contain material irrelevant to the jurisdiction of
the court. The juvenile's prior record, his present location,
results of his and his parents' interview with a probation
officer, the child's school report, welfare report, juvenile hall
report, psychological, psychiatric and medical reports, per-
sonal history and family background, and the probation offi-
cer's evaluation of this information and his recommendation
to the court, are illustrations.
Justification for the exclusion of the social record prior
to the adjudication decision may well be founded on consti-
tutional grounds. In re Gault, In re Winship, and McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania,' provide that the child need not phrase his
constitutional request as one for a criminal right but may
instead claim a fundamental due process right to fair treat-
ment. This applies to civil as well as to criminal proceedings.
Using this approach the question becomes "does the use of
social records by the trier of fact prior to a delinquency adju-
dication constitute a denial of fair treatment?" The tradi-
tional arguments justify use of such records on the helpful,
non-prejudicial nature of the evidence, and convenience.
These arguments may be easily answered. For example, the
statement is often made that the juvenile court's perusal of
the report prior to a decision on the jurisdictional issue would
provide helpful background information! While it may be
true that the social record provides helpful background infor-
' CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 701, 702, 706 (West 1966), construed in In re
R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 860, 464 P.2d 127, 130, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674 (1970); N.Y. FAMILY
CT. AcT. §§ 742-47 (Supp. 1968-1969); Glen, Bifurcated Hearings in the Juvenile
Court, 16 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 255 (1970). For a discussion of the admissibility of
confessions and hearsay see NCCD, MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS rule 25
(1969) and accompanying comment.
91 S. Ct. 1976 (1971) (no jury trial required),
In re R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 861, 464 P.2d 127, 131, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 675 (1970);
Krasnow, Social Investigation Reports in Juvenile Court- Their Uses and Abuses,
12 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 151, 153 (1966) (footnote omited).
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mation concerning the juvenile, the judge's premature re-
view of the social record goes directly to the fairness of the
adjudication hearing. The proponents of review by the judge
prior to adjudication do not seriously dispute (because they
cannot) that the social record frequently contains unreliable
and irrelevant evidence. However, they argue that the possi-
bility of actual prejudice is minimal because the judge will
disregard such information in making the adjudication deci-
sion. The assumption that the judge will not consider irrele-
vant and unreliable information is false. The analogy to a
non-jury trial on the criminal docket is not well taken. We
cannot assume that in a hearing before a judge in a juvenile
court the sifting process takes place. It is clear that despite
the Supreme Court's indication that the adjudication deci-
sion should be separate from the disposition decision, in
practice these decisions are merged. It is most obvious in
those situations where the court does not hold a bifurcated
hearing. And even in those situations in which the judge
gives the appearance, or attempts to give the appearance of
separating the two decisions (adjudication and disposition),
there is still a feeling on the part of many judges that the
decisions are not in fact separate.7 The judges still say that
they need to look at the total picture of the child before they
can make the adjudication. This is a carryover from the pre-
Gault juvenile court. That court was not designed to deter-
mine guilt or innocence but to provide for the best interest
of the child. s Its philosophy minimized the jurisdictional
I Because of this failure to separate the two, the juvenile court will subject
itself to the criticism that delinquency is sometimes decided on issues that evolve
from a social investigation even though the jurisdictional facts have not been clearly
substantiated. In re R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 860 n.5, 464 P.2d 127, 130 n.5, 83 Cal. Rptr.
671, 674 n.5 (1970). The Model Rules for Juvenile Courts suggests that upon the
conclusion of the adjudicatory hearing, the court should set forth the findings of
fact upon which it bases its determination of adjudication. "These findings serve
two purposes: (1) they explain to the parties why the court has the authority to
proceed to the dispositional hearing, and (2) they define the propriety of the juve-
nile court's actions." NCCD, MODEL RULES FOH JUVENILE COURTS rule 27 (1969) and
accompanying comment.
See In re Holmes, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523, 528 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
973 (1955) (Musmanno, J., dissenting); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV.
104 (1909). Judges have based their verdicts on social and psychological data in an
effort to "help the child" rather than on legal proof of delinquency. JUSTICE FOR THE
[Vol. 12
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facts to a level of non-existence. Under the post-Gault phi-
losophy, jurisdictional facts are of prime importance.' Fur-
thermore, the juvenile and his family might be reluctant to
cooperate fully with the probation officer if they thought the
results of the social investigation would become available to
the judge prior to the jurisdictional hearing. Not only would
the probation officer be unable to submit to the court a social
report which contains a complete review of the facts relevant
to the juvenile's disposition, but the important and close
relationship between the juvenile and the probation officer
might be jeopardized.' 0
The arguments based on convenience hold that the pro-
scription of the review of the social record prior to adjudica-
tion would in effect require all proceedings to be bifurcated
to enable the judge to read and evaluate all of the informa-
tion in the social record between the adjudication and dispo-
sition decisions." In addition, since the vast majority of de-
linquency cases are uncontested, the adjudication hearing is
merely a formality analogous to the judge's entry of a judg-
ment of conviction following a guilty plea in a criminal pro-
ceeding. This argument proceeds on the false assumption
that premature consideration of the juvenile's social record
can have a prejudicial effect only at the adjudication hear-
CHILD-THE JUVENILE COURT IN TRANSITION 188 (Rosenheim ed. 1962). There is case
law however, to the effect that information in a social report unrelated to the
particular offense alleged against the child cannot be the basis of an adjudication
of delinquency. For a collection of cases see Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 1128, 1141-43
(1955) and A.L.R.2d LATER CASE SERVICE.
' The importance of the adjudication of delinquency prior to disposition cannot
be minimized. This is implicit in the Supreme Court's decisions in In re Gault and
In re Winship, in which the necessity of separation of jurisdictional facts from
dispositional facts is recognized. This is further bolstered by In re R., in which the
California Supreme Court not only found that the material in the social record was
prejudicial but also found that the juvenile court judge could not be presumed to
have excluded this information when deciding delinquency.
" In re R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 861 n.7, 464 P.2d 127, 131 n.7, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671,
675 n.7 (1970); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT. § 735, Comment (1963).
" There are those who advocate delaying the investigation until after the adju-
dication of delinquency. If the investigation is delayed, then a two-step hearing
procedure would be required. For a discussion of the merits for delaying the investi-
gation until after adjudication see Note, Employment of Social Investigation Re-
ports in Criminal and Juvenile Proceedings 58 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 724-25 (1958).
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ing. A subtle but nonetheless substantial prejudice may re-
sult in any case that is "settled" before a hearing. The youth
or his attorney who knows that the judge has reviewed his
record may justifiably conclude that the judge has pre-
formed notions. As a result, in assessing chances for success
at the hearing, the youth and his attorney may decide not
to contest and to abandon a meritorious defense. If the judge
has preconceived notions, he might consider the decision to
contest simply a manifestation of obstinance and lack of
remorse. The result would be a harsher disposition than if
the youth had capitulated and not contested the case. The
effect of the practice is not unlike the judge taking an active
role in plea bargaining in a criminal proceeding, something
which has been condemned as improper judicial conduct and
highly prejudicial to an accused. Furthermore, such over-
reaching tends to undermine any respect the alleged offender
may have for the system, something that is considered criti-
cal to the rehabilitation of the juvenile offender. One also
wonders whether the court is still not subject to the criticism
that a contesting juvenile who upsets the routine of the court
incurs the wrath of the probation officer and court personnel,
thereby subjecting himself to a harsh punishment and unfa-
vorable reports to correction authorities.
Secondly, the argument is advanced that denying the
judge access to the social record prior to a non-bifurcated
hearing would close the records to him at disposition due to
the time relationship between the adjudication and disposi-
tion decisions. This would deprive the judge of the social
record and would result in dispositions that would not neces-
sarily be in the best interest of the child or society. These
arguments suggest their own answer. While the denial of
access to the record would require some bifurcation, this
would not be necessary in the majority of cases. Only the few
cases in which delinquency is contested will the hearing need
to be bifurcated or at least recessed in order to permit the
judge adequate time to review the social record for disposi-
tion. Obviously, perusal of the social record by the judge
prior to adjudication provides him information which he can
use to justify the adjudication decisions. The point is not
whether it is helpful to the judge but whether it is prejudicial
398 (Vol. 12
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to the youth and improperly considered. Convenience is not
a substitute for a just consideration of the juvenile's case.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Because the pre-adjudication review of the juvenile's
social record by the judge has the effect of undermining the
procedural safeguards to which the juvenile is entitled, the
practice is indefensible and must be changed. However, any
proposal which would deny access to, or limit the review of,
the social record by the judge prior to adjudication undoubt-
edly would encounter considerable resistance. Such a pro-
posal would be contrary to the philosophy of the judge expe-
rienced in the system and would require in the majority of
instances a substantial change in the present procedure. To
permit the judge to make the pre-hearing decisions but to
deny him access to the juvenile's social record would tend to
frustrate the purposes of the preliminary inquiry and the
decision to dismiss the petition without a hearing. The
preliminary inquiry would no longer be to determine
whether the interests of the public or of the juvenile require
that further action be taken. Instead its purpose would be to
make a preliminary judgment on whether the child was in-
volved in the act or offense brought to the attention of the
court by the applicant. The decision to dismiss the petition
without a hearing would no longer be to provide an opportun-
ity to dismiss when it would be appropriate to do so. Instead,
it too would center on the commission of the offense.
In order to preserve the purposes of the preliminary in-
quiry and of the decision to dismiss the petition without a
hearing, as well as the integrity of the final decision, if the
case comes to hearing, the term "juvenile court" must refer
to a qualified person other than the judge. The duties to
compile the social record and to make the decisions at the
pre-hearing stages must be his. These duties must not be
those of the judge, who may ultimately hear the case if the
decision is made not to dismiss. In non-metropolitan dis-
tricts with sparse population and a low incidence of juvenile
cases, there may not be the need nor the funds for a full-time
or even part-time probation officer. In districts where em-
ployment of a qualified probation officer is not feasible due
1972-731
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to cost or need, the answer may be to share a probation
officer with several districts. While this decreases the effi-
ciency of the probation officer, it does provide a system
whereby the judge will not receive irrelevant and unreliable
information prior to the determination of the truth of the
petition.
In those cases that go beyond the pre-hearing stages,
there must be a limitation on review of the social record by
the judge prior to adjudication. The limitation could take
three forms: (1) no review in any case; (2) review only in
uncontested cases; or (3) review in those cases in which the
juvenile has been given or has waived an opportunity to chal-
lenge the relevancy and accuracy of the information in the
social record. Any limitation on review of the social record
prior to adjudication should take into consideration whether
the delinquency is to be contested. If the delinquency is not
contested, then the only critical issue is disposition. The
arguments supporting the necessity for complete denial of
access to the social record prior to adjudication no longer are
applicable. The adjudication is merely a formality.
To limit effectively the review of the social record in
uncontested cases would require: (1) an early determination
of whether the petition will be contested; (2) bifurcated hear-
ings in contested cases; and (3) promulgation of the policy
that social records will not be used in the adjudication hear-
ing. An early determination of contest could be achieved by
an answer to the petition, ascertainment from the parties by
a responsible department that no substantive allegations of
the petition are denied, or a plea proceeding. A bifurcated
hearing is required to prevent the necessity for review of the
social record by the judge prior to adjudication.'2 A bifur-
12 The bifurcated hearing affords a necessary protection against the premature
resolution of the jurisdictional issue on the basis of irrelevant and unreliable infor-
mation in the social record.
The purpose of the social study is to provide the data for a fair and
constructive disposition. The material contained in the social study re-
port is legally irrelevant at the adjudicatory hearing. If the author of the
social study report has admissible evidence of the allegations of the peti-
tion, it can be elicited at the adjudicatory hearing. Therefore, the social
study report, which may contain prejudicial information about the child,
[Vol. 12
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cated hearing, however, does not necessarily prevent the pre-
mature review of the social record. A rule should be estab-
lished, either by the legislature or the court, which insulates
the juvenile court judge from exposure to any information
concerning the juvenile and his involvement with the court
at any time while the case is potentially contestable. This
approach is suggested by the Model Rules for Juvenile
Courts. The Model Rules, however, refer only to the formal
social investigation, and provide that not only should it not
be viewed, but also not prepared in any case which could be
contested.
A social study investigation of the child shall not be com-
menced before the filing of a petition without the written consent
of the parties, and it shall not be commenced after the filing of a
petition unless the responsible department ascertains from the
parties that no substantive allegations of the petition are denied.
If any such allegations are not admitted, no investigation of the
child shall take place, and no report shall be made to the court,
before the adjudication.
The social study shall not be submitted to or considered by
the judge before the adjudication. If no social study has been
prepared before the beginning of the dispositional hearing, or if
the study has not been completed, or if the judge wishes addi-
tional information not reflected in the study, the hearing may be
postponed or continued for a reasonable time.' 3
should not be submitted to this court before the adjudication, even if it
has already been prepared.
NCCD, MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS comment accompanying rule 29 (1969);
accord, STANDARD JUVENILE COURT ACT § 23 (1959); STANDARD FAMILY COURT
ACT § 23 (1964).
For a discussion of the use of the social record at disposition see NCCD, MODEL
RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS rule 30 and accompanying comment (1969); Krasnow,
Social Investigation Reports in the Juvenile Court, 12 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 151
(1966); Waterman, Disclosure of Social and Psychological Reports at Disposition,
70SGOODik HALL L.J. 213 (1969).
'1 NCCD, MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS rule 29 (1969). See also CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 701, 702, 706 (West 1966); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 735
(Supp. 1968-1969). The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Adminis-
tration of Justice has recommended: "To minimize the danger that adjudication
will be affected by inappropriate considerations, social investigation reports should
not be made known to the judge in advance of adjudication." The Administration
of Juvenile Justice-The Juvenile Court and Related Methods of Delinquency
Control, in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEM4ENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 1, 35 (1967);
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We suggest this broader approach because much of the
information concerning the youth in the social record is not
contained in a formal file. For this reason a practice allowing
the judge to consider the social record if the juvenile has an
opportunity to challenge the information is ineffective. Even
if he does not examine the juvenile's file prior to adjudica-
tion, the unique position of the juvenile court judge gives
him social record information. He may be party to conversa-
tions, familiar with the child and his family, or he may re-
ceive unsolicited information from other sources.
Even a prohibition comprehensive enough to include
any information, whether oral or written, will not completely
insulate the judge from exposure to potentially prejudicial
information prior to the hearing. At least the rule would alert
the judge to the new practice and would minimize the possi-
bility of prejudice to the juvenile. If the question does arise,
the issue will be simply whether the child received an impar-
tial hearing or was prejudiced by the judge's exposure to this
information."
accord, NCCD, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN THE JUVENILE COURT 57-61 (1962). Kras-
now, Social Investigation Reports in Juvenile Court-Their Uses and Abuses, 12
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 151, 155 (1966) (footnotes omitted), states a few of the dan-
gers:
lAin adjudication of delinquency should not depend on information
which is not subjected to the legal checks provided by evidentiary safe-
guards. Especially because the juvenile court is free from many of the
usual legal checks and balances found in other judicial and administra-
tive tribunals, it should not be content with a lower standard for the
ascertainment of trust. The consequences of an adjudication of delin-
quency are just as serious as those flowing from decisions by other courts.
Much of the social history of the juvenile is based on data collected from
neighbors who may have a hostile or negative attitude toward a child and
who may be more inclined to make a biased and incriminating statement
to a caseworker than to testify under oath in court. Moreover, the case-
worker's heavy caseload and limited time available for thorough investi-
gation may well result in the appearance of inaccuracy, bias, superficial
analysis, and rank hearsay in the report.
11 In In Re R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 862, 464 P.2d 127, 132, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 676
(1970), the California court when faced with this question reasoned:
The court's review of the social report in advance of the jurisdictional
hearing would perhaps not require reversal in a case in which the contents
of the social study entirely favored the minor and his home environment.
But in the present case the social study showed some inquiry into appel-
lant's intent under section 647a [annoying or molesting a child under 181
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IV. CONCLUSION
Statutory procedure may provide three stages where the
use of social records should be questioned: the preliminary
inquiry; the dismissal of the petition without a hearing; and
the juvenile court hearing. At the preliminary inquiry and at
the subsequent decision to dismiss the petition without a
hearing, the statute may be read to permit either the proba-
tion officer or the juvenile court judge to review the social
record in order to make the decision. Information in the so-
cial record is appropriate when the court has a probation
officer who performs this duty. If the district does not have
a probation officer and the judge must make the decision, his
use of the social records is inappropriate because he may be
the final arbiter in the case. To avoid this dilemma, some
provision for appointment of a probation officer must be
made. The alternative, to take the social record from the
judge at these stages, is undesirable because the respective
purposes of the preliminary inquiry and the decision to dis-
miss the petition without a hearing would change from deter-
mining the desirability of further action to a preliminary
inquiry of guilt.
The juvenile court hearing may be either bifurcated or
non-bifurcated depending on the decision of the judge. The
distinction between the bifurcated and the non-bifurcated
proceedings is important in isolating where, when and how
the use of the social record may affect adjudication. The
contrast between the two-stage and the single-stage hearing
emphasizes the fact that the taint placed on the proceedings
will be more acute in the non-bifurcated proceedings because
of its failure to differentiate sharply between legal proof and
treatment knowledge.
While the distinction between proceedings is important,
it does not resolve the question of the admissibility of social
records prior to adjudication. Under either type of proceed-
and some negative indications about appellant's home environment.
Hence, the court's review of the social study prior to the jurisdictional
hearing, at which the jurisdictional facts were far from conclusive, consti-
tuted prejudicial error.
1972-73]
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ing, there must be statutory or case law that proscribes the
use of social records in adjudication when the delinquency is
contested. If there is, then a model is established that sets
the tenor of the procedure. If no proscription exists, the ques-
tion rests on a constitutional base of whether use of the spe-
cific social record constitutes a denial of fair treatment. The
answer to this question will hinge on what is in the social
record. If the information is unreliable or irrelevant to
whether the juvenile has committed the act charged, and if
this information is unfavorable to the child, then in all likeli-
hood the use of these records should constitute a denial of
fair treatment and thus a denial of due process of law.
